Reflections on Army Culture

(An abridged version of lecture given at the Command and Staff College at Quetta on November 26, 1998).

Patron Lt Gen (Retd) SARDAR FS LODI gave a lecture

on army culture recently.

I would like to give a recent example of this military culture on a larger European canvas. I was in Geneva a few weeks back to attend a three-day meeting on International Humanitarian Law. From the United Kingdom Major General Gordon Risius, Director of Army Legal Services, represented the British Army point of view. In his presentation he said, ‘Some years ago, when I was serving with the British Army of the Rhine. I prosecuted a British soldier for murdering a young German girl. The circumstances of the crime need not concern us, but one feature of the investigation which preceded the trial by court martial has always stuck in my mind. The accused soldier refused to talk to the German police. He was equally reluctant to speak to the British Military Police officer in charge of the investigation. Eventually, however, he agreed to be interviewed by a young British Military Police lance-corporal. He later explained that he felt more comfortable talking to someone closer to his own age, rank and background in other words, a fellow solider’. The General went on to explain that ‘when the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was set up in The Hague some years ago, one of my officers was seconded to the Prosecutor’s office. It quickly became apparent that when it came to questioning military witnesses in front of the tribunal, he had a distinct advantage over his civilian prosecuting colleagues, because he spoke the same military language as the witnesses’. You will notice that an emphasized mention is made of the words ‘military language’ and not merely language.

Coming nearer home. At Karachi I invited Mr. Justice Dr. Ghous Muhammad of the Sindh High Court and Barrister Habib-ur-Rahman for lunch at my club. Justice Ghous had been my colleague at the Law College before he was elevated to the Bench, while Barrister Rahman was principle of the college at the time. I found that during the lunch Justice Ghous and myself got on famously and there was a free flow of conversation between us often to the exclusion of the Barrister who had to be drawn into the dialogue. It was because the Justice had spent a few years with the Army as a civilian legal adviser and spoke the same military language as I did, although from an entirely different professional background.

It is interesting to note how the Army achieves this common military language which certainly contributes to the military culture. I will restrict my remarks to the officer cadre because it is the leadership that matters in the forces. Civilian officer material is inducted into the forces after exhaustive tests. The candidate is required to have some leadership potential which can later be built upon during training to the standard acceptable to the forces. Over and above his physical fitness, the potential cadet must be free from any psychological complexities so that he can shoulder the stress and strain of battle.

Some military analysts are of the opinion that the Army takes its candidates and literally dismantles them. Later on putting the pieces back in a different configuration to suit its own requirements. The verdict may not be as harsh, but the methods employed and the results achieved are somewhat similar. On completion of training the army receives a trained soldier and a leader of men. His initiative and individuality is not altered or destroyed, these are preserved and allowed to develop along constructive lines. We then have a leader who can look at a problem objectively and come to a sensible conclusion.

Officers provide the first and the most important echelon of leadership in the forces. This is of course assisted and reinforced by leadership at the Junior Commissioned Officer level and the Non-Commissioned Officer level. The last two are also important and provide valuable input to the chain of command and cohesion of the force. The most important ingredient of command is of course leadership which is primarily provided by the officer corps.

What is leadership, one may ask. In its basic form it is the leader’s ability to control and dominate his followers and channel their actions to conform to his will. Leadership is essential in any human endeavour, but in the Armed Forces it is absolutely vital. It has been rightly said ‘that military leadership is the most essential element of combat power’. Because once a force is engaged in battle, superior combat power derives from the courage of soldiers, the excellence of their training and above all the quality of their leadership. It is consequently leadership that is the essence of Army culture, which it moulds, creates and sustains under difficult circumstances in peace and war. Army culture creates the commonality of military purpose, the raison d’etre, the purpose of its existence. And finally the justification for its aggressive and offensive role in combat in defence of a higher ideal demanding sacrifices of an order unprecedented in any other service.

Leadership is often a human attribute expanded beyond the normal qualities of courage, perseverance, endurance and the like. Which should have the inherent capacity to combine, sift and analyse the essentials of a given situation with some flair, intuition and maybe a bit of luck. The leader is consequently able to come to the right decision in a manner that may often transcend rationality and be at variance with the obvious solution. In the end it must be remembered that leadership is an art, not a science. It is a talent which some people have and others do not.

To be a successful leader, a person’s professional knowledge and physical fitness must be superior to that of the men he leads. He must inculcate confidence in his subordinates who must trust him and his ability and consistency in decision making. The officers and men in his command must have complete confidence in the belief that their leader has the ability, professional competence and determination to accomplish the task assigned to him in peace and during war with the minimum loss of lives. The outstanding commanders of the second world war seen in victory and defeat, are a good study of the value of professional knowledge to a military leader.

All officers whether in command of troops or in staff assignments must have the ability to pick up the essentials of a problem and the ability to find suitable and tactically feasible answers. The commanders must keep away from details, which correctly belong to the domain of the staff and should be left there. The commander must have time to think and plan ahead. In fact he should be concentrating on the next battle or the second phase of the present conflict.

Training and discipline are two essential responsibilities of the officers. They have to ensure that their subordinates are well trained and have a high standard of discipline. There should be no compromise in these two fields as they are absolutely essential for success in war. It was amply brought out during the second world war that units and regiments that were well trained, had good discipline and were ably led did well in combat, under the stress and strain of battle. They fained better in prisoner of war camps as well.

Decision making is the most important function of an officer’s military career, greater attention should therefore be given to this aspect during peacetime. Army officers at every level of command are taking decisions concerning their responsibilities at all times, and they should certainly be encouraged to do so. As an officer is elevated in rank and responsibility however, the tendency to impinge on the field of responsibility and decision making authority, of the subordinate level is intense, but should be resisted. One of the attributes of a good military leader is to leave decision making at its appropriate level of command and staff or in other words, decentralised. A commander must however keep himself abreast with events in his command and areas of responsibility. All information should therefore be sent to him. It would be worthwhile to keep the following maxim in mind. ‘Information Centralised, Decision making decentralised’.

It must be remembered that it is the commander who earns the laurels for success and it is he alone who should take the censure for failure. Responsibility in the forces is individual and cannot be shared. That is how the military is designed to operate, as there is no other way in war and active operations. ‘It is lonely at the top’, said an old commander, and so it is.

Military decisions are not taken in an arbitrary manner. They are the result of conscious deliberation and consideration of the options available. The following few steps are essential:

Aim: The first principle of war is ‘select and maintain your aim’. In other words you must be sure of what you want to do. The aim should always be kept in mind.

Factors: Next, consider all the factors that have a bearing on your aim. In other words look for all the facts which shape or shadow the situation. Each factor should give you a deduction. A deduction is a course of action.

Courses open: After having considered all the factors, some courses of action or possible decisions should be available to you. The merits and demerits of each course should be considered to enable you to select the best course, in keeping with your aim, which gives you the maximum chance of success.

The process of arriving at a decision is called an appreciation of a situation. It is important to learn the process and mechanics of an appreciation which leads to a decision and an outline plan. With experience and repetition the whole process should naturally come to mind, item by item, culminating in a correct decision. There will be occasions in peace and war where quick and accurate decisions will be required often based on limited information. The process is consequently of considerable importance for a military career, where officers are expected to take correct decisions at all times. That is what they are trained for, and in the final analysis, paid for.

There will be occasions in peace and war when enough time permits a written appreciation. When time is short the appreciation could be in note form. When no time is available, which will often be the case, recourse to a mental appreciation would be essential.

It would be appropriate to narrate two occasions when I was required to make a quick mental appreciation and come up with correct solutions. One was in peacetime and the other during active operations in war.

In August 1978 as Chief of General Staff, my Director of Military Operations and I took off from Qasim Aviation Base (Dhamial - Rawalpindi) on board a Puma helicopter for reconnaissance of the Western border. At Razmak the helicopter could not take off due to oil leakage. The relief helicopter arrived at Wana where we had reached by road much before last night. I was expected back at 1500 hours, so was keen to return to Rawalpindi the same day owing to personal reasons. While the aircraft was being refuelled we had Iftar in silence. Later the pilot of the helicopter, Captain Abid reported that he was ready for take-off. He informed me that we would stop at Bannu to refuel and then make straight for Qasim. I scrutinised his face but found no trace of hesitation. As I was keen to leave, I had to make the final decision, and so my mental process took over. When I deleted my personal reasons as a factor, I found there was no compulsion to fly at night over hilly areas and risk so many valuable lives. I, therefore, decided to stay the night at Wana and take-off in the morning. There was a sense of relief all round and dinner was taken in a more cheerful mood.

We took off in the morning and limped into PAF base at Mianwali as the bad fuel at Wana had clogged the fuel lines. The PAF base commander Air Commodore Bhatti was surprised how we made it to his base. The fuel tanks had to be flushed out and all the fuel lines cleaned before we could take-off again for a comfortable flight to Qasim. Imagine flying at night to Bannu on that bad fuel.

During the 1971 war with India I was commanding an infantry brigade on the Lahore front. I had captured 20 sq miles of Indian territory including many villages. One night the Indian Army put in a night attack by 14 Rajputs supported by a squadron of Centurian tanks and reoccupied one large village China Bedi Chand defended by a company of the Baloch Regiment. The situation was not too clear. The CO reported that his whole company had been wiped out and connected me to his right forward company commander who reported the enemy pouring in across his left flank. I did not believe all that they said but was sure of one fact only that the village had been lost. I studied the map for a few minutes doing a quick mental appreciation in the process and decided to counter attack as the occupation of the village by enemy troops would outflank my forward defences, which could later be unhinged. I had already moved a portion of my Brigade reserve consisting of two rifle companies and a squadron of old Sherman tanks less two troops, in the general direction of the village the day before. The village was retaken by a quick counter attack, and 34 POWs were captured. I found to my surprise that my company of troops had pulled back with few casualties and no enemy troops were pouring in as reported to me. I had of course moved up to see the situation and co-ordinate the attack.

Appreciating the situation and coming to the right decision, through the fog of war, with very little information available, in fact some wrong information being given in the panic and confusion of battle, is the attribute of a good commander. Having made a decision, its vigorous implementation to the point of victory and success is an important ingredient of Army Culture and all that it stands for and implies.

It is indeed the responsibility of every officer to so train himself that he is in a position to take quick and timely decisions on which the successful accomplishment of his given task will depend, and so will the lives of the officers and men in his command and above all, the honour and freedom of his country.

The Pakistan Army inherited a military culture at its independence in 1947, that had stood the test of two world wars. It has gradually and imperceptibly been changing without undue rhetoric. Changes have accommodated domestic requirements and changed conditions in the region and beyond. The new environment has brought greater responsibilities on the leadership of the Army particularly its officer corps. Their leadership and professional competence are as a consequence under greater stress than hitherto. But the tradition of the officer and gentleman as the maker and moulder of the culture and its ultimate sustainer has been maintained. The results are tragically evident in the fighting at the Siachin Glacier area where in a major encounter with the Indians a few years back 1 AK Battalion lost seven officers (including two gunners) and 34 men. Higher the officer casualties in an Army, the greater is the valour of its troops and the superiority of its military culture.

In the end it must be emphasized that service in the Army is not just another job. Its a whole new way of life which is all encompassing with a distinct culture of its own. Which is meant to sustain troops in combat and the whole fighting machine to work smoothly and efficiently even under the pressure, tension and uncertainties of combat. Army culture and its rich heritage spanning periods of peace and war help the team spirit and esprit de corps which are essential for victory in battle. It must be cultivated and nurtured to preserve the fighting spirit and the will to win even under adverse conditions and against heavy odds.